Kantian considerations on representation, aesthetics, the beautiful, and the sublime

Abstract

Kant (1724-1804) introduced the term aesthetics in the Critique of Pure Reason, referring to the pure forms of a priori sensible intuition: space and time. These forms, part of the transcendental dimension, condition the reception of sensible intuitions, internally organized by time and externally by space. For Kant, time subordinates all objects as phenomena of sensibility. He conceived the term “transcendental aesthetics” to describe the pre-existing structure that allows for the reception of sensible intuitions, differing from the critique of taste. Kant states that knowledge requires sensitivity (reception of representations) and understanding (formation of concepts applied to these intuitions). However, despite the centrality of the notion of representation, he did not provide a complete definition, using it in parts of the Transcendental Logic and Transcendental Aesthetics. This study analyzes the conditions of its formulation and dissemination in Kantian critiques.

In the aesthetic judgment, Kant explores why it does not produce knowledge, making its objective universalization impossible. Declaring something as beautiful seeks its universality, but others' disagreement can generate frustration, highlighting the subjectivity of aesthetic taste.

The second part addresses the Analytic of the Beautiful and the Analytic of the Sublime, highlighting the ruptures and innovations brought by the Critique of the Power of Judgment. The beautiful is analyzed in relation to pleasure and pain, and the roles of determinative and reflective judgments in the aesthetics of the beautiful. The aesthetics of the sublime, encompassing its mathematical and dynamic forms, are explored in their connections with nature, morality, and the formless.